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ABSTRACT 
 
Our aim is to empirically examine how reasons for using private equity (PE) and prior 
experience with PE affect the willingness of privately held firms to cede company control. Based on a 
questionnaire entailing 75 privately held firms backed by PE, we show that family firms cede less 
control than non-family firms when entering a PE transaction. However, if firms seek funds due to 
challenges related to ownership changes, the difference between family firms and non-family firms 
decreases. Moreover, we find that family firms sell more company shares if they are run by a PE-
experienced manager. 
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I. Introduction 
For entrepreneurial firms, gaining access to financial resources is one of the key 
challenges they face to survive or successfully grow (Dawson, 2011; Scholes, Wright, 
Westhead, Bruining, & Kloeckner, 2009). In particular, for many small privately held 
firms, of which family firms are the predominant form, it is difficult to access external 
debt resources due to the high level of information asymmetries between external 
capital providers and privately held firms (Cole, Goldberg, & White, 2004). 
Information asymmetries result in a higher perceived default risk for financial 
investors, since assessing and forecasting the state of financial status of small 
privately held firms is problematic (Ang, 1992; Cole et al., 2004). Additionally, 
turbulence in capital markets in recent years has led to the more restrictive financing 
policies of banks (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). Therefore, it has become 
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increasingly difficult to access debt. Besides debt financing strategies, one possible 
way for companies to solve financing problems is to open up the company’s capital 
to private equity (PE) investors. PE firms allocate finance for firms in return for equity 
shares (Landström, 2007; Mason & Harrison, 1999). Since one of their objectives is 
to obtain high returns at the end of their investment, PE firms typically intervene in 
the firm’s decision making by implementing control levers such as board or veto 
rights (Lerner & Schoar, 2005).  
Loss of company control has a greater impact on family firms than for non-
family firms, since their wealth includes not only financial but also socioemotional 
wealth, which largely depends on controlling the firm (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007). Hence, family firms favor minority investments, since they are able to benefit 
from the managerial experience of PE firms while maintaining company control 
(Tappeiner, Howorth, Achleitner, & Schraml, 2012). However, in certain situations, 
family firms may be willing to accept a relatively large loss of company control. 
Especially in times of crisis, family firms may be forced to cede more company 
control to PE firms. We therefore aim to examine different financing reasons for 
seeking PE, such as to solve challenges related to ownership, to foster growth, or to 
overcome a company crisis (Tappeiner et al., 2012). Moreover, we aim to examine 
how prior experience with PE affects the willingness to give up company control in 
both family and non-family firms. While inexperienced chief executive officers 
(CEOs) may consider PE a threat to socioemotional wealth, leading to the limited 
willingness of family firms to cede company control to PE firms, CEOs having 
experienced PE may be open to PE financing and, thus, may be willing to sell more 
company shares to PE firms. 
Our study is built on data gathered from a questionnaire of privately held 
German firms backed by PE. We received 90 questionnaires, an overall response rate 
of 14.7%. Through exclusion due to missing data and the fact that some firms were 
never PE backed, our final analysis consists of 75 companies. We define a firm as a 
family firm if the family holds 50% or more of voting shares prior to the PE 
investment. 
Our analysis outlines three main results. First, family firms sell fewer 
company shares to PE firms than non-family firms do. We therefore find evidence 
that the pursuit of company control plays a bigger role in PE investments for family 
firms than for non-family firms. Second, we find that the difference in the proportion 
of shares family and non-family firms are willing to sell to PE firms depends on the 
reasons for seeking PE. If PE is to be employed for reasons related to ownership, the 
difference between family and non-family firms is less pronounced. Third, we show 
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that family firms are willing to give up the same proportion of company control as 
non-family firms if their CEO is familiar with PE transactions. 
The paper contributes toward a better understanding of differences in PE 
investments with regard to the allocation of company shares in privately held firms 
in three main ways. First, we refer to the theory of socioemotional wealth to extend 
the family firm literature (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). So far, 
there is no empirical evidence that family and non-family firms differ in willingness 
to cede company control to PE firms. We contribute to this research gap by revealing 
that retaining control when seeking PE is of higher importance for family firms than 
for non-family firms. Thus, family firms sell fewer company shares to PE firms than 
non-family firms do. We add to the literature by showing that, in financing decisions 
as well, the family firm’s preliminary goal is to retain control over the firm to avoid 
the loss of socioemotional wealth. Second, this study broadens our knowledge by 
showing that financing reasons have an impact on the proportion of transferred 
control. Family firms seeking PE for reasons related to ownership changes are willing 
to sell more company shares to PE firms than family firms using PE for other 
financing reasons. We therefore contribute to the ongoing heterogeneity debate 
(Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013) by 
revealing that family firms differ in willingness to cede company control depending 
on the financing reason. Third, we contribute to the research on intuitive decision 
making, since we find that prior experience in PE plays a crucial role when 
investigating the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. In particular, experienced 
CEOs express less prejudice and negative stereotyping toward PE and are willing to 
cede more company control to PE firms than inexperienced CEOs are. 
 
 
II. Background Literature and Hypothesis Development 
A. Family Firms and PE 
The construct of socioemotional wealth that was developed from behavioral agency 
theory defines and separates family firms from non-family firms (Gomez-Mejia, 
Welbourne, & Wiseman, 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). According to 
behavioral agency theory, companies make decisions that preserve their accumulated 
endowment. The accumulated endowment of a family firm is its socioemotional 
wealth. Socioemotional wealth arises from the specific characteristic of family firms 
that strongly consider both financial and nonfinancial goals (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). It consists of five dimensions (Berrone et al., 2012). The 
first dimension refers to family control and its influence on the firm. Other 
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dimensions outline the emotional attachment of family members, their identification 
with their firms, as well as strong commitments between the family itself and its 
business partners. Moreover, the renewal of the firm’s family bonds through dynastic 
succession plays a major role for family members (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Retaining control over the family firm to pursue the family’s interests and 
therefore to create, preserve, and increase socioemotional wealth is highly desired by 
family members (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010). 
Otherwise, the family might not be able to continue to manage the firm according to 
its expectations of socioemotional wealth (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & 
Chua, 2012). The higher the concentration of firm ownership in the family hands, the 
stronger the family’s influence on the firm’s strategic decisions (R. C. Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013). In other words, socioemotional 
wealth is stronger with increasing control through ownership (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). 
While families try to strengthen their influence over their firms, they are 
confronted with loss of control when entering a PE transaction. Additionally, goals 
between PE firms and family firms often differ significantly. Capital investment firms 
are mainly interested in high returns when exiting investments through an initial 
public offering, a trade sale, or a secondary sale and therefore stick to financial goals, 
whereas family firms also follow nonfinancial goals. Moreover, one aim of family 
owners who pursue and build socioemotional wealth is to hand over the firm to the 
next generation (Berrone et al., 2012). This implies that, in contrast to PE firms, which 
invest for a limited time horizon, mostly about five to 10 years, family firms pursue 
a long-term view and are interested in long-lasting relationships (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Dawson, 2011). 
However, PE offers certain advantages besides financial resources. Family 
firms can benefit from PE investors’ extensive knowledge and experience (smart 
money). Nevertheless, the retention of control plays a major role for family firms in 
PE investments (Tappeiner et al., 2012). Minority investments of PE firms therefore 
prove to be particularly attractive for family firms, since they have to cede fewer 
control rights to PE firms while still gaining access to their managerial expertise 
(Tappeiner et al., 2012). Socioemotional wealth can therefore be preserved. The 
higher the proportion of shares sold to PE firms, the greater the loss of control over 
the firm and, thus, the greater the threat of not being able to preserve socioemotional 
wealth. 
We therefore believe that the loss of control over a company has a greater 
effect on family firms than on non-family firms, since their wealth includes financial 
and socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-
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Mejia et al., 2003). Decision making in family firms is mainly affected by 
socioemotional wealth and, thus, family firms prioritize their goals differently than 
non-family firms do (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In particular, the avoidance of loss 
of socioemotional wealth takes precedence over other goals and, hence, family firms 
are averse to risking their nonfinancial wealth (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Therefore, 
socioemotional wealth is the accumulated endowment of family firms and the 
employment of PE results in a loss of company control, thus jeopardizing 
socioemotional wealth. We therefore propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms sell fewer company shares to PE firms than non-
family firms do. 
 
B. Impact of Financing Reasons on the Willingness of Family Firms to Cede 
Control 
When investing in privately held family firms, PE firms encounter principal 
problems, such as high information asymmetry, due to the organizational nature of 
privately held firms (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996; Wright & Robbie, 1998). 
Shareholders of privately held firms have insider information about the company, the 
capability of its managers, and forthcoming challenges. In addition, shareholders may 
further hide business information and act opportunistically. Therefore, capital 
investment firms screen potential portfolio firms by conducting a due diligence 
investigation to evaluate the potential investment target (Dawson, 2011; Franke, 
Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006; Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux, 1996; Riquelme & 
Rickards, 1992; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999; Zacharakis & Meyer, 
2000). By gaining company control, PE firms attempt to reduce information 
asymmetries and to increase the likelihood of the portfolio firm’s future success, thus 
increasing the likelihood of receiving high returns at the end of their investment. In 
addition, PE firms typically intervene in the firm’s decision making by implementing 
control levers such as board rights or veto rights (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003). 
Consequently, the shareholders of portfolio firms face loss of control over 
their firm as PE is acquired. According to agency theory, initially established by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), portfolio firms also encounter principal problems. As 
PE firms gain control over a firm, they gain the opportunity of intervening in the 
business decision making. In this context, PE firms could exploit such possibilities 
and misuse their power by not sticking to commonly fixed strategic firm goals. These 
practices could harm the portfolio firm and, further, result in damages to the 
company’s image. 
PE firms and family firms pursue different aims when entering a PE 
transaction. Generally, family firms need financial means but are not willing to give 
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up control over their company (Tappeiner et al., 2012). For family firms, retaining 
control over the firm to pursue the family’s interests therein and therefore create, 
preserve, and increase socioemotional wealth is highly desired (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Thus, they aim to sell only a small proportion of shares to PE firms. In contrast, 
investment firms pursue high returns at the end of their investment (Mason & 
Harrison, 1999). PE firms aim to gain control over firms to intervene in the strategic 
decision making. Hence, PE firms aim to buy high proportion of shares from family 
firms. Therefore, a main issue during the negotiation process pertains to the 
distribution of company shares between the PE firm and the family firm. Which of 
the two parties is best able to pursue its interests depends mainly on the allocation of 
power and enforcement. Family firms mainly employ PE to solve problems related to 
ownership changes, to foster growth, or to manage a company crisis (Fenn, Liang, & 
Prowse, 1995; Tappeiner et al., 2012). These reasons largely determine the 
negotiation power of PE firms and family firms. 
 
Seeking PE to Solve Problems Related to Ownership Changes  
Preferences and beliefs among shareholders differ, which can lead to 
disagreement about firm policies (Bagwell, 1991). Conflicts between shareholders 
can arise due to personal or interest differences, including divergent opinions in the 
context of strategic decision making. Hence, privately held firms may encounter 
problems related to ownership, including conflicts between shareholders (Fenn et al., 
1995; Tappeiner et al., 2012). Conflicts between shareholders threaten a company’s 
wealth, since strategic decisions can be blocked by shareholders of the conflicting 
party. Therefore, privately held firms rely on PE financing to buy out the shareholders 
of the conflicting party and thereby solve the conflict. 
Family firms seek PE particularly to resolve challenges related to ownership 
changes. Conflicts between family members and the exit wishes of family 
shareholders greatly affect the socioemotional wealth of the family firm (Tappeiner 
et al., 2012). A conflict between family shareholders implies a disagreement between 
shareholders. In contrast to non-family firms, family firm shareholders are personally 
interconnected with each other, since they belong to the same family. We believe that 
emotional bonds are weaker between the family members of family firms facing 
conflicts than between the family members of family firms without conflicts. Hence, 
there is relatively little socioemotional wealth due to the fact that one of its dimension 
refers to the emotional attachment of family members (Berrone et al., 2012). Family 
members may accept greater loss of company control, since they have less to lose due 
to their lower levels of company wealth. 
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However, ownership changes are not always rooted in disagreements between 
shareholders but can also arise when shareholders leave the family firm due to old 
age. Family firms pursue socioemotional wealth by continuing the tradition of the 
firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012; Zellweger et al., 2012). In 
recent years, successor problems in family firms have increased due to the non-
availability of family successors (Schlömer & Kay, 2008). In such cases, family 
members will be forced to sell their company shares to external investors. Hence, the 
level of socioemotional wealth is low, since one of its dimensions refers to the 
dynastic succession to renew family bonds (Berrone et al., 2012). 
If the level of socioemotional wealth is low, the decision making of family 
firms converges toward that of non-family firms, since company wealth mainly 
consists of only financial and not socioemotional wealth. 
We therefore argue that family firms seeking PE to solve problems related to 
ownership changes sell more company shares than family firms using PE under other 
financing reasons (Berrone et al., 2012). Hence, we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 2a: Financing for ownership reasons negatively moderates the 
relation between family firms and the proportion of total shares sold: The difference 
in the proportion of shares sold to PE firms between family and non-family firms 
becomes less pronounced if firms use PE to resolve challenges related to ownership 
changes. 
 
Seeking PE to Realize Growth Strategies 
PE is one source of funding to realize growth strategies. PE firms prefer 
investing in firms that need to finance growth strategies, since growth could result in 
a sustainable increase in enterprise value over time. The greater the enhancement of 
enterprise value, the higher the return on investment for PE firms when exiting the 
firm. Thus, PE firms are willing to accept fewer shares than for other financing 
reasons, since the investment is less risky and there is the prospect of a high return on 
investment. Companies generating profits and intending to grow may also have the 
opportunity to obtain alternative forms of financing and therefore are not dependent 
on PE financing. Hence, firms that use PE for growth strategies have an advantage in 
negotiations. 
It is especially important for family firms to retain company control to 
preserve socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). If family firms seek PE to 
realize growth plans, we believe that their socioemotional wealth is great and 
therefore needs particular protection through family control and ownership. Due to 
high levels of socioemotional wealth and a good negotiation position, family 
members will be even more unwilling to cede company control to PE firms when 
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realizing growth strategies. Therefore, the difference in the proportion of shares sold 
to PE firms between family firms and non-family firms is pronounced when family 
firms seek PE to realize growth strategies. We suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2b: Financing for growth reasons positively moderates the 
relation between family firms and the proportion of total shares sold: The difference 
in the proportion of shares sold to PE firms between family and non-family firms 
becomes more pronounced if firms use PE to realize growth strategies. 
 
Seeking PE to Overcome a Company Crisis 
PE is often used to resolve financial distress (Hotchkiss, Strömberg, & Smith, 
2014; Tappeiner et al., 2012). A company crisis is an acute risk for the firm that could 
end in insolvency. Most often, not only financing but also external strategic support 
is needed to prevent the company from failing (Berger & Udell, 1998). Firms with 
financial constraints are usually fraught with severe difficulties when entering 
external debt financing. Most often, PE is the last opportunity to obtain any financing 
at all and, thus, avoid insolvency. Therefore, distressed firms have rather little 
negotiation power in contrast to PE firms. Moreover, PE firms investing in distressed 
companies enter a high-risk relationship leading to claiming major control over the 
firm in order to intervene in its strategic decision making. 
Family members of family firms are even more strongly affected by a 
company crisis than the shareholders of non-family firms, since they could lose not 
only their financial but also socioemotional wealth. A company crisis threatens 
socioemotional wealth because a crisis could end in bankruptcy, which would destroy 
the firm’s financial and socioemotional wealth. Moreover, through close ties between 
the family and the firm, family members may blame themselves for the company’s 
failure (Berrone et al., 2012; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Shepherd, Wiklund, & 
Haynie, 2009). We therefore argue that family firms are willing to give up more 
control under crisis circumstances than for other financing reasons, since they want 
to circumvent bankruptcy under all costs. PE as a last resort could give them the 
opportunity to avoid the loss of at least part of their socioemotional wealth compared 
to company failure. We therefore hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 2c: Financing for crisis reasons negatively moderates the relation 
between family firms and the proportion of total shares sold: The difference in the 
proportion of shares sold to PE firms between family and non-family firms becomes 
less pronounced if firms use PE to overcome a company crisis. 
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C. Impact of Prior Experience with PE on the Willingness of Family Firms to 
Cede Control  
Prior experience plays an important role when investigating strategic decision making 
(Park & Banaji, 2000; Wegener & Petty, 1994; Worth & Mackie, 1987). We believe 
that experience with PE has an effect on the willingness to cede company control to 
PE firms. In 2005, a public debate on PE caused serious damage to the image of PE 
firms. The so-called locust debate was initiated by Franz Müntefering, a Social 
Democrat of Germany, when he compared PE firms with swarms of locusts feeding 
on portfolio firms (Lutz & Achleitner, 2009). Since the debate, PE firms have been 
stereotyped as acting ruthlessly to achieve high rates of returns without considering 
the needs and goals of business owners and their employees (Davis, Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, Lerner, & Miranda, 2011). Such prejudice against PE firms is even stronger 
among family firms, since they consider this reputed behavior of PE firms a threat to 
socioemotional wealth, leading to limited willingness to cede company control to PE 
firms. Therefore, non-experienced CEOs regard PE as a financing method of last 
resort and are therefore only willing to sell a small proportion of company shares to 
PE firms. Prior experience with PE could help overcome prejudice against PE 
investments. In particular, the CEOs of family firms who are experienced with PE 
may consider PE investments a chance to professionalize the firm to increase both 
financial and socioemotional wealth. Thus, experienced CEOs are willing to give up 
more company control to PE firms than inexperienced CEOs are. 
In addition, decision making in family firms is more irrational and therefore 
less intuitive than in non-family firms, since it is often based on emotions and 
sentiment (Berrone et al., 2012). We therefore believe that prior experience has a 
greater impact on decision making in family firms than in non-family firms. We 
hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 3: Prior experience with PE negatively moderates the relation 
between family firms and the proportion of total shares sold: The difference in the 
proportion of shares sold to PE firms between family and non-family firms becomes 
less pronounced if the decision makers of privately held firms are experienced with 
PE. 
 
III. Sample and Research Design 
A. Sample 
This study is built on data gathered from a questionnaire of privately held German 
firms backed by PE. All the firms were privately held before employing PE. Using 
the Amadeus database, we obtained data on 614 privately held firms that, according 
to the database, had used PE. We sent standardized questionnaires to the managing 
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directors of these firms, since they are responsible for key strategic and financial 
decision making. If multiple managing directors ran the company, we prioritized 
CEOs. We received 90 questionnaires, an overall response rate of 14.7%. Through 
exclusion due to missing data and the fact that some firms were never PE backed, our 
final analysis consists of 75 companies (19 family firms and 56 non-family firms). 
Following Armstrong and Overton (1977), we controlled our data for nonresponse by 
comparing early and late respondents in terms of our selected dependent and 
independent variables. The results outline no significant differences. Hence, we 
assume that the nonresponse bias is not a major issue in our analysis. 
 
B. Measurements 
Shares sold to PE firm. To measure the loss of company control, we use the 
proportion of shares sold to PE firms as the dependent variable. To obtain information 
about ownership, we asked in the questionnaire about the proportion of shares sold to 
PE firms. This measurement is based on studies showing that ownership reflects 
control and influence over a firm (R. C. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2013). 
Family Firm. The main independent variable of interest indicates whether a 
firm is a family firm or not. Consistent with the study of Stockmans, Lybaert, and 
Voordeckers (2010), a company is perceived as a family firm if one family owns at 
least 50% of company shares prior to the PE investment. The variable is measured 
dichotomously, since we distinguish between family firms (coded one) and non-
family firms (coded zero). 
Reason for Seeking PE. To determine the reason for seeking PE, we included 
a question in the questionnaire asking participants to give their reason for employing 
PE: i) ownership changes, ii) financing growth, iii) financial crisis, or iv) others. For 
each financing reason, we created a dummy variable equal to one if that reason for 
seeking PE was selected. 
Prior Experience with PE. Prior experience with PE indicates whether 
participants already had experience with PE. The variable takes the value one if the 
participants were experienced in PE and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables. Consistent with the work of Wilson, Wright, Siegel, and 
Scholes (2012), we control for the industry (Dummy industry), firm size (Dummy firm 
size), and firm age (firm age) of the portfolio firms. In terms of industry, we 
distinguish between companies that belong to either the service or the manufacturing 
industry. In doing so, we build a dummy variable that is coded one if the company 
belongs to the service sector and zero if the company is associated with the 
manufacturing industry. We thus differentiate industries whose companies have high 
investment costs, with high amounts of capital tied up, and that are consequently 
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under liquidity greater pressure (i.e., manufacturing firms) compared to companies in 
other industries (e.g., in the service industry). 
Moreover, we control for firm size and firm age to test effects related to the 
size and lifecycle, respectively, of the company. In doing so, we included a question 
in the questionnaire asking participants about the firm’s age. We measured firm age 
as the number of years since the firm was founded. To gain information about firm 
size, we asked participants about the firm’s total assets in 2014. To classify firms 
according to size, we used the provisions of the German Commercial Code (HGB) as 
guidelines. The HGB categorizes firms as small, medium, and large according to total 
assets, the number of employees, and the amount of sales. We used the HGB 
classification categories for total firm assets and asked participants to fit the company 
into one of these categories. In doing so, we define firm size = 1 if total assets were 
equal or higher than 19.250 k€ and zero if lower. We control for firm size, since small 
firms have higher agency costs compared to large firms due to the higher risk for 
company failure. 
We construct a dummy variable Legalform used for the legal form of the 
portfolio firms, coded zero if the shareholders enjoy unlimited liability for their 
business and personal assets and one if the liabilities are limited to the company’s 
assets. Shareholders who enjoy unlimited liability for their business and personal 
assets may sell fewer shares to PE firms, since they fear loss of the company’s assets 
as well as the loss of their personal assets. In addition, we control for the year of 
investment of the PE deal. In times of financial crisis, portfolio firms may sell more 
shares to PE firms, since they need additional financial support. 
 
C. Common Method Bias (CMB) 
Since we obtained data from each respondent using a single methodology 
(questionnaire), we must consider CMB (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). Chang, van Witteloostuijn, and Eden (2010) outline several 
strategies that we used to minimize and control for CMB. First, we avoid utilizing the 
subjective evaluations of managing directors. Asking for the total proportion of sold 
shares to PE firms leads to an objectively measured dependent variable. Moreover, 
our independent variables can be considered objective, since we asked the 
participants about the reason for using PE and their prior experience with PE. Second, 
we used Harman’s one-factor test to analyze the extent of CMB (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In doing so, we included every variable into a non-rotated principal component 
analysis (PCA). If only one factor is derived from the PCA, it would account for 
CMB. Within our analysis, 10 factors were extracted from the PCA, the largest of 
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which explained only 22.4% of the given variance. Hence, we conclude that CMB is 
not a major concern in our research. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Table 1 provides an overview of key descriptive statistics. The means and medians of 
the characteristics of PE investments with regard to family and non-family firms are 
reported. The statistics indicate that family firms sell fewer shares to PE firms than 
non-family firms do. We also report the means and medians of variables relevant to 
our research model. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of PE Investments 
  
 Total Family firms Non-family firms 
P-values of the 
difference 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Shares_sold 75 70.093 80 19 53.895 60 56 75.589 82.5 0.002 0.006 
Dummy 
re_owner-
ship 
75 0.387 0 19 0.421 0 56 0.375 0 0.637 0.724 
Dummy 
re_growth 
75 0.533 1 19 0.632 1 56 0.500 0.5 0.836 0.324 
Dummy 
re_crisis 
75 0.133 0 19 0.105 0 56 0.143 0 0.341 0.679 
Dummy 
prior_ 
exp_pe 
75 0.547 1 19 0.474 0 56 0.571 1 0.233 0.426 
Investment_
year 
75 2007.987 2008 19 2005.737 2006 56 2008.8 2009 0.011 0.014 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of the relevant variables in our econometric models. Our sample 
consists of 75 privately held firms backed by PE. The last two columns report the two-sided P-values for the 
difference between family and non-family firms in means and median, respectively. The results show that 
family firms sell fewer shares to PE firms than non-family firms do. We use T-tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) to test 
the difference in means (medians). 
 
To test our research design we run several ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
Tobit regressions. Table 2 outlines the OLS regressions and Table 3 the Tobit 
regressions. 
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Table 2: Results of OLS Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dummy ff  -20.12*** -29.82*** -19.40* -22.00*** -36.92*** 
  (7.183) (7.774) (10.63) (7.664) (9.220) 
Dummy re_ownership   19.45***    
   (6.274)    
Dummy re_ownershipxdummy ff   20.40*    
   (12.05)    
Dummy re_growth    -18.90***   
    (6.765)   
Dummy re_growthxdummy ff    4.072   
    (13.61)   
Dummy re_crisis     -1.982  
     (9.832)  
Dummy re_crisisxdummy ff     17.66  
     (21.39)  
Dummy prior_exp_pe      5.228 
      (6.328) 
Dummy prior_exp_pexdummy ff      36.60*** 
      (12.64) 
Firm_age -0.0330 -0.00643 0.0196 -0.0490 -0.00981 -0.0182 
 (0.0736) (0.0709) (0.0620) (0.0694) (0.0720) (0.0648) 
Dummy industry -4.367 -6.809 -8.562 -5.664 -6.553 -4.777 
 (6.606) (6.361) (5.553) (6.056) (6.452) (5.835) 
Dummy firm_size 25.66*** 21.52*** 18.22*** 19.57*** 21.76*** 24.00*** 
 (6.886) (6.732) (6.021) (6.449) (6.802) (6.206) 
Investment_year -0.218 -0.579 -0.422 -0.546 -0.601 -0.793 
 (0.685) (0.666) (0.580) (0.632) (0.673) (0.613) 
Dummy legalform 44.86** 40.74** 56.73*** 39.20** 40.26** 34.18* 
 (19.57) (18.73) (16.63) (18.25) (18.95) (17.26) 
Constant 452.0 1,188 850.9 1,135 1,232 1,618 
 (1,372) (1,335) (1,163) (1,268) (1,350) (1,231) 
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.221 0.302 0.487 0.389 0.310 0.436 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the OLS regression models. Model 1 outlines the impact of the control variables. Model 2 includes the main variable of interest, family firm. Models 3 to 
5 exhibit the results of the interaction terms of each reason for seeking PE (Model 3, ownership; Model 4, growth; Model 5, crisis) on the relation between family firms and the proportion of 
shares sold to PE firms separately. In Model 6, we show the results of the interaction term of prior experience with PE on the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to 
PE firms. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Results of Tobit Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Dummy ff  -20.12*** -29.82*** -19.40* -22.00*** -36.92*** 
  (6.839) (7.293) (9.972) (7.190) (8.650) 
Dummy re_ownership   19.45***    
   (5.886)    
Dummy re_ownershipxdummy ff   20.40*    
   (11.30)    
Dummy re_growth    -18.90***   
    (6.345)   
Dummy re_growthxdummy ff    4.072   
    (12.77)   
Dummy re_crisis     -1.982  
     (9.224)  
Dummy re_crisisxdummy ff     17.66  
     (20.06)  
Dummy prior_exp_pe      5.228 
      (5.936) 
Dummy prior_exp_pexdummy ff      36.60*** 
      (11.86) 
Firm_age -0.0330 -0.00643 0.0196 -0.0490 -0.00981 -0.0182 
 (0.0706) (0.0675) (0.0582) (0.0651) (0.0675) (0.0608) 
Dummy industry -4.367 -6.809 -8.562 -5.664 -6.553 -4.777 
 (6.337) (6.057) (5.209) (5.681) (6.052) (5.474) 
Dummy firm_size 25.66*** 21.52*** 18.22*** 19.57*** 21.76*** 24.00*** 
 (6.605) (6.410) (5.648) (6.050) (6.381) (5.822) 
Investment_year -0.218 -0.579 -0.422 -0.546 -0.601 -0.793 
 (0.657) (0.634) (0.544) (0.593) (0.631) (0.575) 
Dummy legalform 44.86** 40.74** 56.73*** 39.20** 40.26** 34.18** 
 (18.77) (17.83) (15.60) (17.12) (17.77) (16.19) 
Constant 452.0 1,188 850.9 1,135 1,232 1,618 
 (1,316) (1,271) (1,091) (1,190) (1,266) (1,155) 
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 
 
Notes:This table presents the results of the Tobit regression models. Model 1 outlines the impact of the control variables. Model 2 includes the main variable of interest, family firm. Model 3 
present the results for the interaction terms of each reason for seeking PE (Model 3, ownership; Model 4, growth; Model 5, crisis) on the relation between family firms and the proportion of 
shares sold to PE firms separately. In Model 6, we show the results for the interaction term of experience with PE on the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE 
firms. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Following a hierarchical approach, we first conduct an OLS and a Tobit 
regression including only control variables (Model 1). The control variables Dummy 
firm_size (25.66, p ≤ 0.001) and Dummy legalform (44.86, p ≤ 0.05) are significant 
and positively influence the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. The regression 
coefficient of Model 2 outlines that, if the company is a family firm, the proportion 
of shares sold to PE firms decreases by 20.12 percentage points (p ≤ 0.001), revealing 
an economically relevant effect of family firms on the proportion of shares sold. 
Family firms sell significantly fewer shares to PE firms than non-family firms do. 
This finding supports Hypothesis 1 and prior literature indicating that family firms 
differ from non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Chen, 
Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). We find evidence that the pursuit of company control plays a bigger role in PE 
investments for family firms than for non-family firms. Thus, our findings are 
consistent with prior studies indicating that the family firm’s preliminary goal is to 
retain control over the firm and, hence, the loss of company control could threaten 
the socioemotional wealth of the family firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). We argue that the prevention of the loss of 
socioemotional wealth leads to the outlined differences in the extent of company 
control family and non-family firms are willing to transfer to PE firms. 
Models 3 to 5 outline the interaction effects of our independent variable, for 
family firms, with each reason for seeking PE (ownership, growth, and crisis) to test 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. To illustrate the impact of financing reasons on the 
willingness of family firms to cede control, we outline three regression models 
illustrating the effect of i) ownership (Model 3), ii) growth (Model 4), and iii) crisis 
(Model 5) financing reasons, respectively, on the relation between family firms and 
the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. 
Model 3 outlines the effect of the ownership financing reason on the relation 
between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. This interaction 
is significant at the 10% level. The regression coefficients of the interaction terms 
indicate that the ownership financing reason has a positive impact on the relation 
between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. 
Figure 1 plots the interaction term of the ownership financing reason against 
the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms in. 
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Figure 1: Interaction effect of the ownership financing reason on the relation between family firms and 
the proportion of sold shares 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the gap between family and non-family firms 
decreases when PE is sought to resolve challenges related to ownership. The gradient 
of the slope for family firms is therefore higher (+39.86) in contrast to the gradient of 
the slope for non-family firms (+19.45). The results outlined therefore support 
Hypothesis 2a. If family firms employ PE for reasons related to ownership, they sell 
more shares to PE firms than do family firms seeking PE for other financing reasons. 
With regard to the proportion of shares sold to PE firms, family firms come close to 
the proportion of shares non-family firms sell to PE firms. Thus, family firms seeking 
PE for reasons related to ownership accept greater loss of control than family firms 
employing PE for other financing reasons. We suggest that our result derives from 
the weaker emotional bonds between the family members of family firms facing 
conflicts than the family members of family firms without conflicts. Hence, the level 
of socioemotional wealth is lower due to the fact that one of its dimension refers to 
the emotional attachment of family members (Berrone et al., 2012). With regard to 
our argumentation, we conclude that family firms facing ownership challenges 
possess less socioemotional wealth and therefore behave more similarly to non-
family firms employing PE. 
We were unable to estimate the influence of the growth and crisis financing 
reasons on the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE 
firms because the interaction terms are not significant in Models 4 and 5. In addition, 
the independent variable Dummy re_crisis is not significant in Model 5. Therefore, 
the results for the growth and crisis financing reasons seem to be inconsistent. 
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However, we plot the effects of the growth and crisis financing reasons separately 
against the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms 
to display tendencies with regard to Hypotheses 2b and 2c. 
 
Figure 2: Interaction effect of the growth financing reason on the relation between family firms and the 
proportion of sold shares 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the gap between family and non-family firms remains 
nearly the same when firms seek PE for reasons related to growth. Moreover, both 
family and non-family firms are willing to sell fewer company shares to PE firms 
when seeking PE to realize company growth. However, the interaction term is not 
significant and we therefore cannot support Hypothesis 2b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            Henn & Lutz • Private Equity in Family Firms 18 
Figure 3: Interaction effect of the crisis financing reason on the relation between family firms and the 
proportion of sold shares 
 
 
 
Figure 3 exhibits the interaction term between the crisis financing reason and 
family firms. The results show that the difference between family and non-family 
firms regarding willingness to give up company control tends to decrease. In other 
words, family firms accept greater loss of company control when they seek PE to 
overcome a company crisis. However, the interaction term is not significant and we 
therefore cannot support Hypothesis 2c. 
Within Model 6, we test Hypothesis 3, since we estimate the influence of PE 
experience on the relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to 
PE firms. This interaction is significant at the 1% level and has a positive sign, 
indicating that personal experience with PE has a positive impact on the relation 
between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms. 
Figure 4 plots the significant interaction term of personal experience on the 
relation between family firms and the proportion of shares sold to PE firms to analyze 
and interpret results. 
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Figure 4: Interaction effect of prior experience with PE on the relation between family firms and the 
proportion of sold shares 
 
 
If the CEOs of family firms do not have PE experience, family firms sell fewer 
shares to PE firms than non-family firms do. In contrast, the gap between the 
proportion of shares family and non-family firms are willing to sell to PE firms closes 
if the CEO is experienced with PE. The gradient of the slope for family firms is 
therefore higher (+41.83) in contrast to that for non-family firms (+5.23). The result 
is significant at the 1% level and has a positive sign; we therefore confirm Hypothesis 
3. If CEOs of family firms are already familiar with PE, these family firms will sell 
more shares to PE firms than family firms with CEOs with no PE experience. With 
regard to the proportion of shares sold to PE firms, family and non-family firms sell 
the same proportion of company shares to PE firms. Thus, experienced CEOs of 
family firms accept greater loss of control than family firms run by inexperienced 
CEOs do. One possible explanation is that experienced managers of family firms do 
not consider PE a threat to socioemotional wealth but, rather, emphasize the smart 
money of PE, for example, to benefit from PE investors’ extensive knowledge and 
experience to professionalize the firm and increase both financial and socioemotional 
wealth. 
Table 4 presents the results of our multicollinearity analysis. The dependent variable 
for the proportion of sold shares to PE firms is negatively correlated with the 
independent variable for family firms. All the values of the correlations are under the 
critical threshold of 0.7, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (D. Anderson, 
Sweeney, Williams, Camm, & Cochran, 2014). Additionally, we examined the 
variance inflation factors to test multicollinearity (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
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All their values stayed below the critical threshold of 10 (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2015). 
We therefore conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue in our research. 
 
Table 4: Mean Values, Median, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
We assume that our results are robust, since we find no major changes in our 
control variables between our models in terms of significance or direction. In 
addition, we apply propensity matching to identify a suitably matched sample of 
family firms for comparison with non-family firms. In doing so, we first conduct a 
probit regression to determine the likelihood of being a family firm, dependent on the 
matching variables. Second, the propensity score is used to match family firms to 
their nearest non-family firm neighbors. Matching pairs with a difference in 
propensity score greater than 0.1 are dropped. Third, we run T-tests to estimate mean 
differences. The results of the matching model are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median SD VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Sold_shares 70.093 80 28.878 - 1
2 Dummy ff 0.253 0 0.438 1.16 -0.3289* 1
3 Firm_age 50.387 32 49.529 1.44 0.1218 0.1736 1
4 Dummy industry 0.333 0 0.475 1.06 -0.1216 -0.1517 -0.1872 1
5 Dummy firm_size 0.627 1 0.487 1.26 0.3908* 0.1208 0.3871* -0.0975 1
6 Investment_year 2007.987 2008 5.012 1.30 -0.0258 -0.2632* -0.4040* 0.0928 -0.1350 1
7 Dummy legalform 0.973 1 0.162 1.08 0.1967 -0.0939 -0.0710 -0.0585 -0.1278 0.2157 1
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Table 5: Propensity Score Matching 
 
Variables N mean delta result of T-test on mean difference 
Sold shares 17 23.5882 
Significance  
of level 1% 
 
      
Matching variables       
Firm_age 
  -9.1767 Not significant 
Dummy industry 
  -0.1176 Not significant 
Dummy firm_size 
  0.1764 Not significant 
Investment_year 
 -1.7647 Not significant 
Dummy legalform 
 Not reported  
 
 
The outcomes of the propensity score matching are in line with our regression 
results. A difference of 23.59 percentage points between family and non-family firms 
with regard to the proportion of shares sold to PE firms is estimated at the 1% 
significance level. Additionally, the robustness of our results is confirmed by the non-
significance of the T-tests of our matching variables. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Our study empirically examines PE investments in privately held firms. In particular, 
we shed light on differences in the distribution of company shares between family 
and non-family firms after PE was employed. In doing so, we investigate if family 
firms differ from non-family firms in willingness to cede company control to PE 
firms. Moreover, we empirically study the influence of financing reasons and prior 
experience with PE on the relation between family firms and the willingness to cede 
company control to PE firms. Our study uses a unique dataset of 75 privately held 
firms that used PE. We constructed our dataset with the data from standardized 
questionnaires sent to the directors of German privately held and PE-backed firms. 
Our analysis outlines three main results. First, we find evidence that family 
firms sell fewer company shares to PE firms than non-family firms do. This finding 
reinforces the great importance of control through ownership in family firms and 
therefore confirms the theory of socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). Second, we show that family firms behave differently depending 
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on the reason for seeking PE. Family firms are willing to cede more company control 
to PE firms if they seek PE for reasons related to ownership changes. The difference 
in the proportion of shares sold between family and non-family firms becomes less 
pronounced when firms seek PE to solve problems related to ownership. Third, we 
find that, in family firms, prior experience with PE leads to greater willingness to 
cede company control to PE firms. In particularly, PE-experienced CEOs of family 
and non-family firms sell the same proportion of company shares to PE firms when 
entering a PE transaction if at least one CEO of the firm is familiar with PE. Our 
findings reinforce those of Chua et al. (2012), who argue that family firms are 
heterogeneous. Willingness to cede company control to PE firms differs within the 
group of family firms depending on financing reasons and PE experience. 
This study aims to contribute to the family firm literature on differences 
between family and non-family firms by elaborating on socioemotional wealth theory 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), on family firm literature dealing 
with heterogeneity, and on the intuitive decision making literature, since we are able 
to show that prior experience in PE also influences the willingness to cede company 
control to PE firms. 
Our results have some limitations due to our small sample. Therefore, the 
results are not necessarily representative of PE investments in general. However, the 
availability of data is limited, since the overall population of German privately held 
and PE-backed firms is small. Moreover, since we chose German privately held firms 
for our analysis, we have to acknowledge that the family firms of other countries may 
behave differently when using PE. In contrast to Continental European countries, 
public equity is of greater importance in Anglo-Saxon countries (Mayer, 1990; 
Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Hence, Anglo-Saxon 
firms go public earlier in their lifecycle (Pagano et al., 1996). In addition, the stock 
exchange is accessible to everyone, whereas in Continental European countries the 
public equity market mainly consists of old, established, large firms (Pagano et al., 
1996). It is easier for Anglo-Saxon family firms to use public equity to finance growth 
strategies than for Continental European firms. Anglo-Saxon firms might therefore 
prefer public equity to realize growth strategies and therefore use less PE in contrast 
to German firms. 
Our study could serve as a starting point for future analysis. Additional 
research could shed light on different levels of socioemotional wealth in PE-backed 
family firms. Prior literature shows heterogeneity to be of great interest in family firm 
research (Chua et al., 2012; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Hence, it would be interesting to 
examine the relation between the willingness to give up company control to PE firms 
and different levels of socioemotional wealth in family firms. We therefore encourage 
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future quantitative and qualitative studies in these directions to gain a better 
understanding of differences in PE investments in family firms. 
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